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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between collective remittance leveraging programs 
and community development in the Global South, with a focus on the case of Mexico’s 
3x1 Program for Migrants. I will show that Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants fails in 
its objective to foster participatory development among poor and marginalized 
communities, pointing out some of the limitations associated with this model of 
development. Further, by scoping out and linking this social program with the dominant 
discourse surrounding the relationship between migration, remittances, and development, 
I will argue that the discursive representation that positions migrants as “agents of 
development” acts to depoliticize the relationship between migration and 
underdevelopment in Mexico. 
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In recent years, much attention has been paid to the relationship between 
migration and development in the Global South. Once considered the result of 
“development failure”, migration, and in turn migrants, have recently been reframed as 
powerful agents of development by policy makers and development practitioners around 
the globe (de Haas, 2012:14). In particular, there has been much focus on the 
developmental impact of the economic remittances migrants send home to their families 
each year, which in 2014 exceeded four hundred thirty four billion U.S. dollars 
(WorldBank, 2014). Further, migrant organizations such as hometown associations1 
(HTAs), which have for many years been contributing social and economic resources to 
their communities of origin, have been increasingly commended by governments and 
institutions around the world for their positive contributions to development in the Global 
South (Kunz, 2012:103). Recently, many nations have implemented policies and social 
programs which attempt to leverage the social and economic capital of their diaspora for 
specific development projects, including (but not limited to) Mexico, El Salvador, 
Somalia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012:4). While these 
policies and programs do differ in content and implementation, many are based on the 
model of Mexico’s innovative 3x1 Program for Migrants that matches the financial 
contributions of HTAs three-to-one (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012:4). The recent interest 
in migrant remittances, coupled with an increasingly optimistic discourse surrounding the 
                                                          
1 Hometown associations are migrant organizations “composed of migrants from the same community” 
(Burgess, 2012:120).  
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relationship between migration and development, has resulted in international 
organizations and financial institutions framing migrants as powerful development actors 
(de Haas, 2012:9)2. This new development trend begs a few questions, such as: What 
impact are the contributions of migrants having on their communities of origin? To what 
extent do migrant organizations have the potential to elicit meaningful social and 
economic change in underdeveloped nations? What constraints exist that hinder their 
ability to contribute to sustainable development in their nation of origin? These questions 
are paramount to the future of development research, in a world that is increasingly 
becoming defined, reshaped and impacted by the processes of migration.  
For my undergraduate thesis I have chosen to explore the relationship between 
collective remittance leveraging programs and community development in the Global 
South, with a focus on the case of Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants. I will show that 
Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants fails in its objective to foster participatory 
development among poor and marginalized communities, pointing out some of the 
limitations associated with this model of development. Further, by scoping out and 
linking this social program with the dominant discourse surrounding the relationship 
between migration, remittances and development, I will argue that the discursive 
representation that positions migrants as “agents of development” acts to depoliticize the 
relationship between migration and underdevelopment in Mexico.  
                                                          
2 Institutions and Organizations which have celebrated the relationship between migrant remittances and 
development in recent years include (but are not limited to) the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Labour Office, The International Organization for Migration, and the United 
Nations Development Program (de Haas, 2012:9) 
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In this thesis, I will first provide an overview of the theoretical lens’ that are often 
applied to the study of migration and development and explain why I have chosen to 
conduct my research using the transnational theory of migration framework. Second, I 
will explore the literature pertaining to my chosen topic and situate myself within the 
often polarized debate that occurs in regards to this area of inquiry. Third, I will provide a 
brief overview of the methodologies I have used and the empirical findings of my 
research. Lastly, I will provide a discussion based on my findings.  
Section II 
Adopting a Transnational Lens 
According to Stephen Castles (2014), “migration is a process which affects every 
dimension of social existence…[and] as interest in migration research has grown in 
recent years, theoretical approaches have proliferated…leading to a more complex 
understanding of migration and its links with broader processes of change” (p.21). 
Historically, neoclassical economic analysis and historical-institutional theoretical 
approaches have dominated the field of migration studies.  
Neoclassical economic analyses of migration tend to focus primarily on the 
phenomenon of migration at the individual level, assuming that the choice to migrate is a 
rational, market based decision. Under this approach, analyses may focus on factors such 
as “demand for labor…[or] good economic opportunities” to explain why individuals 
choose to migrate (Castles, 2014:22). In regards to remittances, it is pointed out by 
scholars such as Ben Page (2012) that the vast amount of literature surrounding this 
subject has been influenced by neo-classical economic analysis (p.2). Much of the 
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literature focuses on the “direct impacts of remittances on growth, poverty 
reduction…[and] also the indirect macro-economic impacts…[on] exchange rate policies, 
labor supply and productivity” (p.2). Criticisms of this approach are that it tends to be a-
historical (in that it does not look at the historical, or structural, determinants of migration 
and remittances) (Castles, 2014:23), and that this approach tends to “naturalize” 
remittances, treating them as “intrinsic to a diaspora lifestyle...pushing questions about 
the practice of remitting into the background” (Page, 2012:4).  
The historical-institutional approach to migration has its intellectual roots in 
Marxist political economy, and in particular the dependency theory of the 1960s (Castles, 
2014:26). In contrast to the neo-classical economic approach to migration studies (in 
which the rational individual is the primary unit of analysis), the historical-institutional 
lens looks at the phenomena of migration at the macro-level, linking this process to the 
“unequal distribution of economic and political power in the world economy” (Castles, 
2014:26). In this sense, the structure under which migration occurs becomes the main unit 
of analysis (Castles, 2014:26). While this approach can be very useful in terms of relating 
migration and its resulting practices (such as remittances) to the overarching social and 
economic structure, it is criticized for viewing this structure as “all-determining, while 
paying inadequate attention to human agency…[such as] the motivations and actions of 
the individuals and groups involved” (Castles, 2014:27). 
In recent years, we have seen an emergence of scholars who seek to provide a 
more nuanced and interdisciplinary approach to the study of migration, and its associated 
processes (Castles, 2014:27). One such interdisciplinary approach is the transnational 
theory of migration, which emerged in the 1990s in an attempt to address the 
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shortcomings of the approaches mentioned above, which are often viewed to be too “one 
sided to analyse adequately the great complexity of contemporary migration” (Castles, 
2014:27). Unlike historical-institutional approaches (under which the global economic 
system is often the unit of analysis, with little mention of human agency), and the 
neoclassical approach (which are most often individualistic analyses that do not consider 
historical or social factors), adopting a transnational lens provides the opportunity to 
analyze migration and its associated processes in a more nuanced and interdisciplinary 
way (Castles, 2014:p.27, 30-31).  
Although there are variances in its application, central to the transnational 
approach or perspective, is the focus on "how the cross-border practices of migrants and 
non-migrants, individuals as well as groups and organizations, link up in social spaces 
criss-crossing national states, mould economic, political and cultural conditions, and are 
in turn shaped by already existing structures" (Faist, 2013:2). According to Faist (2013), 
the analytical framework underpinning transnational theory can be broken down into 
three components. First, is the concept of “transnationalization”, which refers to the 
overarching processes under which actors, groups and institutions operate (p.2). This 
could be processes such as neoliberal globalization, or the globalization of labor within 
the capitalist system, for example. Second, is the concept of “transnational social spaces”, 
which refers to the linkages, circuits, and community identities that extend beyond the 
borders of a single nation state (Faist, 2013:2). It could be said that HTAs, and the 
various linkages they create and maintain between their country of origin and residence, 
create a transnational social space. Lastly, is the concept of “transnationality”, or the 
“degree of connectivity between migrants and non-migrants across national borders”, by 
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way of things such as the transfer of knowledge between migrants and non-migrants, and 
the sending and receiving of remittances (Faist, 2013:2).  
         Essentially, the transnational perspective on migration allows one to explore the 
ways in which migrants and non-migrants are linked, through the strong ties created and 
maintained during the migration process, with an understanding that the resulting 
transnationalism, is a product of overarching social, economic and political structures. 
This last tenet is particularly important, and acts as a defining feature of transnational 
theory. Nina Glick-Schiller, a scholar who has contributed immensely to the formulation 
of transnational theory, argues that in order to understand transnational processes “we 
must begin by recognizing that the world is currently bound together by a global 
capitalist system” (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992:8). To Glick-Schiller (1992), what 
underpins the transnational perspective is the assumption that “the development of the 
transnational migrant experience is inextricably linked to the changing conditions of 
global capitalism, and must be analyzed within that world context” (p.19). It is argued 
that the strength of transnational analysis is that it acts as a framework under which 
“global economic processes…can be linked to migrants’ social relationships, political 
actions, loyalties, beliefs, and identities” (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992:8).  
 The topic of my thesis is the relationship between collective remittance leveraging 
schemes and community development in the Global South, with a focus on Mexico’s 3x1 
Program for Migrants. According to Steven Vertovec (2004), economically speaking, 
“the most transformative processes and phenomena of migrant transnationalism have 
concerned remittances, the money migrants send to their families and communities of 
origin” (p.984). While much of the literature pertaining to this topic has focused on 
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descriptive, economic based analyses, transnational theory can provide a framework that 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of interventions aimed at leveraging migrant 
remittances. Beyond just providing a descriptive analysis of the Mexican social 
program’s contribution to community development, the adoption of a transnational lens 
allows room to question why the Mexican diaspora has been courted as development 
actors, what constraints exist to hinder the creation of meaningful transnational 
partnerships, and what the role of non-migrants is (or should be) in this process. 
Transnational theory is relatively flexible, it allows room to navigate various fields of 
inquiry. It is a “bottom up” approach to understanding social processes, which refers to 
the way this approach begins by looking at the phenomena of migration at the migrant 
level, before scoping out to explore the way in which the migrants’ experiences, actions, 
and choices (such as, the choice to remit), are shaped by overarching structural factors 
(Faist, 2013:18). This is achieved by studying phenomena as they occur (such as, how 
migrants organize and remit) and then exploring how these processes are shaped by the 
wider economic, social and political contexts in which they are deeply embedded. 
Section III 
Review of the Literature 
According to Hein de Haas (2012), debates surrounding the relationship between 
migration and development have a long and complex history (p.8). While, historically, 
mass out-migration was viewed as the result of, and in turn further contributed to, 
underdevelopment, a new and more optimistic view began to emerge in the 1990s (p.8). 
In particular, one of the main focuses of this new migration and development optimism 
has surrounded an immense interest in the development potential of migrants’ economic 
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remittances, which, in general, refers to the flow of money from migrants to people and 
communities in their country of origin (de Haas, 2012:9). The emergence of this 
optimism, which has been adopted by governments, financial institutions and 
development organizations around the globe, has coincided with the proliferation of 
neoliberalism (de Haas, 2012:9). Neoliberalism, in this context, refers to a political 
economic model (touted by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF) that de-
emphasizes the role of the state in bringing about social and economic change, and 
instead emphasizes the power of individuals and the market (de Haas, 2012:20; Bakker, 
2014:24). This model’s tendency to “shift attention away from structural 
constraints…[and the] crucial role that states play in shaping favourable conditions for 
human development” (de Haas, 2012:22) has greatly impacted development practices 
over the past three decades. This is evidenced by the emergence of market-based 
solutions to poverty and underdevelopment, such as micro-credit, and the optimism 
surrounding the development potential of private flows of capital, such as migrant 
remittances (Bakker, 2014:24).  
The optimism surrounding migrant remittances has resulted in a recent increase in 
policies and programs specifically designed to link the capital of diasporas with 
development objectives in the Global South (Pellerin and Mullings, 2013:89). These 
policies and programs vary greatly. For example there are fiscal policies that attempt to 
stimulate diaspora investment in local businesses, and social programs (such as Mexico’s 
3x1 Program for Migrants) that attempt to leverage collective remittances for community 
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development projects (Julca, 2013:374,375) 3. This emerging trend is referred to by some 
scholars (Pellerin and Mullings, 2013; Boyle and Kitchin, 2014) as “the Diaspora 
option”, which is a term defined as an “emerging policy orientation aiming at utilizing the 
human, economic and social capital of migrant populations in order to revitalize levels of 
investment, skill and development in the places with which they maintain ancestral ties” 
(Pellerin and Mullings, 2013:93). It is argued by Boyle and Kitchin (2014) that “the 
essential logic underpinning diaspora engagement remains the same: overseas 
communities have resources and attachments which, if harvested properly, have the 
potential of accelerating economic growth and development in the home country” (p.18).  
 The vast majority of economic remittances fall into the category of worker 
remittances (also known as family or individual remittances) (Goldring, 2004:822). These 
flows are characterized by the transfer of money directly from a migrant working in a 
host nation to a non-migrant in their country of origin (most often a family member) 
(Goldring, 2004:812). There has been much discussion about the potential of leveraging 
these personal transfers, however, many scholars acknowledge that worker remittances 
themselves have little developmental potential since they typically represent personal 
income for the non-migrant with a high percentage (between eighty and ninety percent in 
Mexico, for example) being utilized for non-productive consumption purchases, such as 
food, clothing and medicine (Adida and Girod, 2011:7; Fox and Bada, 2008:438; 
Goldring, 2004:809, Torres and Kuznetsov, 2006:105). Given the personal nature of these 
flows (wages that are remitted to cover basic needs of family members), it is generally 
                                                          
3 For a full list of the various policies and programs aimed at increasing or leveraging remittance flows, as 
implemented by forty four countries across the Global South, see: Julca, A. (2013). Can Immigrant 
Remittances Support Development Finance? Panoeconomicus. 60(October 2012), 365–380 
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accepted that Governments should refrain from the direct leveraging of these flows for 
development purposes, and instead only focus on making it easier and cheaper for 
migrants to remit their hard earned money (Ratha, 2007:2).  
According to Luin Goldring (2004), the acknowledgement that workers’ 
remittances are personal money, is, in part, what has led to the emergence of a series of 
academic debates surrounding the developmental potential of “collective remittances” 
(p.808). This term refers to the “longstanding practice on the part of migrant 
organizations (also referred to as Hometown Associations or HTAs), namely, their 
fundraising and subsequent construction of various projects to benefit their communities 
of origin, something they have done for decades” (p.808). These remittances (or, 
philanthropic donations) are seen as “collective” in that they refer to “money raised by a 
group that is used to benefit a group or community with which it is affiliated” (Goldring, 
2004:808). Goldring (2004) proposes that the immense interest Governments have shown 
towards collective remittances in recent years can be viewed as “an effort [on behalf of 
the Government] to move beyond the impasse in the debate on the potential for 
leveraging family remittances for development, and as part of the consolidation of a 
development model which emphasizes the market and public–private partnerships” 
(p.809). Indeed, governments in no less than fifteen countries have recently began to 
introduce programs that are designed specifically to leverage collective remittances 
towards localized development projects4 (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:4; Julca, 
2013:20). While these programs differ in content and scope, many of them are modeled 
                                                          
4 Countries include: Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Nicaragua, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, 




after a social program that was first implemented in Mexico in 1999, called 3x1 Program 
For Migrants, of which Aparicio and Meseguer (2008) provide a concise (albeit, very 
brief) overview:  
       The 3x1 Program for Migrants is administered by the Mexican  
       Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) following the initiatives 
       of hometown associations. A Committee of Validation and Attention to 
       Migrants (COVAM), which includes representatives of the four parties  
       involved (migrants, municipal, state, and federal government via  
       SEDESOL), prioritizes and decides on the technical viability of the  
       projects. Each of these parties contributes 25% of the total cost of the     
                   approved project. (p.11) 
 
The purpose of this program is to contribute to community development in Mexico, with 
a focus on the poorest communities that have historically been effected by high levels of 
marginalization (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:3). In particular, to gain approval by the 
program’s project evaluation committee5, projects are supposed to be those that are 
related to the provision of public goods that will benefit the entire community (such as 
electricity, public water works, and roads), or “productive” projects (like an agricultural 
cooperative, or educational scholarship) (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:11; Wadell, 
2015:10; Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez, 2012:293). Given that Mexico’s 3x1 Program 
for Migrants is seen as a pioneer in the area of collective remittance leveraging, scholars 
who are involved in the academic debate surrounding the potential for this development 
model often draw heavily on this program when formulating their arguments. 
Works by scholars who have contributed to the academic debate surrounding the 
developmental potential of collective remittances can generally be grouped into two 
categories. Some scholars (Waddell, 2015; Torres and Kuznetsov, 2006; and Zamora, 
                                                          
5 “Each project demands the creation of a “community committee” – which comprises representatives 
from the three levels of government plus the sponsor migrant association” (Simpser et. al, 2015:10) 
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2005) argue that programs aimed at leveraging collective remittances are progressive, 
participatory social programs that contribute to local (or community) development in a 
country of origin, and as such, suggest that a variety of policy measures should be taken 
to maximize this potential. The second group (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008; Bada, 2015; 
Macias, 2012; Fox, 2008; Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez, 2012; Kunz, 2006, 2011) argue 
that the leveraging of collective remittances have little, or even a negative, impact on 
development in a country of origin, with some arguing that further attempts to leverage 
these flows should be avoided until the impacts are better understood. I will further 
discuss the works of the authors who occupy these polarized positions in the next section 
of this review.  
Authors such as Waddell (2015), Torres and Kuznetsov (2006), and Zamora 
(2005), situate themselves on the positive side of the academic debate, in that each of 
these authors highlights the potential collective remittance leveraging has to function as a 
progressive and participatory model for community development. Torres and Kuznetsov 
(2006) propose that collective remittances “are a manifestation of the human and social 
capital generated by labor-exporting regions with intensive international out-migration” 
(p.100). This claim is made based on the authors’ positioning of collective remittances as 
a positive result of the social networks that have been created due to increased labor 
mobility between Mexico and the USA in recent years (p.100). Further, it is argued by 
Torres and Kuznetsov that the public/private partnerships (meaning the partnership 
between the Mexican Government and HTAs) created by interventions such as the 3x1 
Program for Migrants, has immense potential for aiding community development, in that 
these partnerships can help to channel migrant capital into development projects at the 
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community level (p. 101,102). They (2006) draw heavily from the successful projects 
implemented under Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants, proposing that this social 
program provides a gateway for participatory development, which in this context refers to 
the active involvement of Mexican migrants in the planning and carrying out of 
development projects in their communities of origin (p.102). In particular, they argue that 
the 3x1 Program for Migrants provides Mexican migrants with a clear channel to have 
their voice heard during the planning and execution phases of development projects, 
while also encouraging the transfer of “social capital” back to the migrant sending region 
(e.g., the knowledge and skills migrants have gained while working and living in the 
USA) (p.100). For these reasons, they view migrants as important development actors, 
and conclude that “migrants’ capital offers a clear entry point for local development” 
(Torres and Kuznetsov, 2006:102).  
Waddell draws similar conclusions in his work which compares the development 
potential of family and collective remittances in Mexico. He (2015) argues that in a world 
where development financing is increasingly difficult to procure, collective remittances 
represent a “relatively unexploited resource bank for developing countries” (p.5). In his 
analysis, he purports that programs which attempt to leverage collective remittances have 
been overwhelmingly successful in terms of contributing to sustainable community 
development, and that Mexico’s grant matching scheme may “represent a “win-win” in 
that the state benefits from the influx of extra development funds and migrants benefit 
from the state’s capacity to oversee development projects” (p.13).  
In a similar vein, Zamora (2005) also considers social programs designed to 
leverage collective remittances as having great potential. Drawing examples from the 
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Mexican case, he argues that while family remittances may already be “earmarked to 
cover basic needs”, migrants abroad (from countries which have high levels of out-
migration) should be courted as “development actors”, since it has proven possible to 
leverage their capital for productive and sustainable development purposes (p.32). For 
each of the scholars mentioned above, collective remittance leveraging is seen as having 
immense potential for creating a development model based on transnational 
public/private partnerships and active citizen participation.  
It is important to note, that the articles discussed above all drew their conclusions 
based on the perceived “success” of Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants, by looking at a 
very narrow sample of the many implemented projects. Waddell, for example, drew his 
conclusions by analyzing projects which were completed only in select communities 
within the Mexican State of Guanajuato. Similarly, Zamora’s analysis considers only one 
small community in Zacatecas. This is problematic as other authors have noted that 
studies such as these provide a very limited contribution to the debate on the development 
potential of collective remittance leveraging, since they do not discuss issues that may 
arise such as unequal access to funds between migrants and non-migrants, program 
participation levels across regions, nor do they attempt to “offer any counterfactual 
comparison among communities that participate in the program and otherwise similar 
ones that do not participate” (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008;8,9).  
In contrast to the supportive analyses of collective remittance leveraging 
programs, scholars such as Aparicio and Meseguer (2008), Xóchitl Bada (2015), Flores 
Macias (2012), Jonathan Fox (2008), Yoko Kijima and Goracio Gonzales-Ramirez 
(2012) and Rahel Kunz (2006, 2011) each provide arguments to discount (to varying 
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degrees) the positions mentioned in the above section. Some scholars, such as Flores 
Macias (2012) focus on the theoretical underpinnings of collective action to call into 
question the replicability of collective remittance leveraging programs. In his (2012) 
article, Macias argues that while the anecdotal “success stories” of collective remittances 
“suggest that the development potential is enormous”, we need to be careful in drawing 
conclusions based on this evidence alone (p.418). In an analysis which draws from 
examples of project implementation in both Mexico and El Salvador (both of which 
created similar collective remittance matching schemes), he highlights the immense 
coordination issues that arise, and the differential outcomes that occur not only between 
countries, but among regions, when social programs rely on the logic of transnational 
partnerships between migrants and their State of origin. He (2012) argues that these 
programs have very little potential for replicability, partly because “collective action is 
hard to achieve, and the complications are even greater in the context of diffuse, long-
distance, transnational developmental partnerships” (p.442). In other words, it is 
proposed that the design of development initiatives such as Mexico’s 3x1 Program for 
Migrants, which rely on the sustained collective action of international migrants (who are 
not a homogenous group), may not be sustainable, or easily replicable. 
Other scholars focus on directly discounting the perceived “success” of Mexico’s 
3x1 Program for Migrants. Bada (2015) argues that not only are the majority of projects 
implemented unsustainable, but inequality is inherent in the design of government 
programs which attempt to leverage the capital of their diaspora. Drawing from the case 
of Mexico, he shows how these government interventions place too much importance on 
HTAs and migrants as agents of development, while local voices are often lost in the 
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development discussion altogether (p.3). He (2015) argues that the trend towards 
leveraging collective remittances creates a new hierarchy which favors USA based 
Mexicans over those who actually live in the communities where projects are being 
implemented. For example, in Mexico there are many local community groups which 
have great ideas, but no access to funds; sometimes creating tensions between migrants 
and non-migrants who may have different ideas of what a community’s needs are (p.3). 
Other sources back up this idea of “conflicting interests” by pointing out that “few cross-
border membership organizations support grassroots development agendas” in their 
communities of origin (Fox and Bada, 2008:454). According to the research of Rahel 
Kunz (2006), the silencing of local voices is inherently linked to the discourse 
surrounding remittance leveraging for development, which is evidenced by the choice of 
actors who are considered by policy makers to be relevant in the remittance and 
development arena (p.6). Kunz (2006) is quick to point out that in the design of Mexico’s 
3x1 Program for Migrants, “the main protagonists are the migrants and the three levels of 
the government. The voices of the non-migrant community members are often not 
considered important” (p.7). In this sense, scholars are discounting the arguments which 
posit this model of development as being inherently participatory (Torres and Kuznetsov, 
2006; Kunz, 2006; Bada, 2015) by asking the question: participation for whom?  
This position is further exemplified by the works of Aparicio and Meseguer 
(2008) and Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez, (2012), whose articles act to discount the 
argument that collective remittance leveraging schemes are progressive, participatory, 
and pro-poor, social programs. Despite the common claim that these programs can 
function to channel resources to communities that “need them the most” (which in this 
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context refers to those with historically high levels of poverty, marginalization, and out-
migration) it is argued that collective remittance leveraging programs are designed in 
such a way as to exclude poor municipalities, and in some ways may be biased against 
the poorest segments of a population (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:3; Kijima and 
Gonzalez Ramirez, 2012:302). In the case of Mexico, HTAs are responsible for the 
design and submission of project proposals (which is considered essential to incentivize 
migrant participation), however, for a variety of reasons, poor and/or marginalized 
municipalities are far less likely to have an established HTA representing them abroad, 
often leaving them excluded in program development (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:3; 
Kijima and Gonzalez Ramirez, 2012:302). Indeed, if we look at figures from 2007, it is 
shown that less than one quarter of project funds were actually channelled to 
municipalities with high levels of poverty and marginalization (Aparicio and Meseguer 
p.11).  Since relatively wealthier municipalities are receiving the lion’s share of project 
funds, it is suggested that programs such as the 3x1 Program for Migrants may indeed 
function to increase regional inequality, while also marginalizing the voices of non-
migrants in the development of their own communities (Bada, 2015:9; Aparicio and 
Mesguer, 2008; Kijima and Gonzalez Ramirez, 2012).  
This position becomes more problematic when we consider the political economic 
impacts of collective remittance leveraging schemes. Scholars point out that their impacts 
are not only unequal for the reasons mentioned above, but can induce a “public moral 
hazard”, which refers to the way that “these new institutional forms [can] mask a net 
reduction in public finance” (Grabel, 2009:94). These programs may indeed function to 
reinforce and legitimize the notion that the State is not responsible for providing even the 
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most basic of infrastructure and services (such as potable water or an electricity grid) 
(Goldring, 2004:824), by reducing migrants, to “economic and political resources – to 
objects of policy” (Iksander, 2010:275). Qualitative findings collected by Manuel Orozco 
during interviews with HTA representatives show that migrants often express their own 
concerns in this regard, in that they fear that the Mexican Government may shirk their 
responsibilities “because migrants will take care of things” (Orozco, 2003:9).  
Further, scholars such as Leigh Binford are quick to point out that the immense 
focus on the possibilities of migrants’ economic contributions to development, can often 
mask a much wider and inequitable relationship between migration and exploitative labor 
practices in the global capitalist system (Binford, 2003:325). He (2003) holds that we 
need to understand why remittances have surged in recent years, why States have recently 
“discovered” their diaspora, and what role this plays in maintaining the rapidly intensified 
globalized division of labour (Binford, 2003). Globalized capitalist production relies on 
international migration to “occupy slots at the bottom of the economic food chain, as 
subcontracted labor power to agricultural, construction, textile and office cleaning 
firms…as service providers, domestics, nannies, gardeners, car wash attendants, grocery 
workers…who enable the comfortable lifestyles of economically accommodated classes” 
(Bindord, 2003:325). For Binford, remittances, thus, are rightfully framed as a 
consequence of an inequitable global system, and the pursuing of policies that seek to 
maintain (and capitalize) on these flows are seen as missing the point altogether, acting to 




An examination of the literature pertaining to collective remittance leveraging 
shows that there are a variety of perspectives on the impacts these programs can have on 
communities of the Global South. Without a doubt, we must acknowledge that migration, 
and moreover, the transnational ties that are created between migrants and their country 
of origin are acting to shape many facets of society in migrant sending regions. While 
this, in and of itself, is not a negative thing, it is important that we understand the 
implications of programs, such as Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants, on local 
community development. On one hand, it is shown that collective remittances can, and 
do, contribute to the provision of infrastructure and services in migrants’ communities of 
origin. However, many scholars have pointed out these programs may have unintended 
consequences (such as regional inequality, the marginalization of local knowledge and 
voices, the legitimization of “governing from a distance”, and the maintaining of an 
inequitable division of labor, etc.). Furthermore, there is room to question the 
sustainability of programs such as these, which are not designed to address the significant 
structural constraints human beings face in marginalized, underserved communities. A 
HTA may be able to help finance the building of a water pump, but will they provide the 
maintenance of said pump further down the road? A scholarship is a great idea, but will 
the recipient be able to find meaningful employment within their home country upon the 
completion of their program, or will they follow their predecessors and migrate upon the 
completion of their studies? Is this really a panacea for meaningful community 
development or does the discourse simply attempt to mask the structural issues that have 






 Given that I have been conducting secondary research for the purpose of this 
thesis, the majority of the data (both qualitative and quantitative) that I use in this thesis 
to back up my claims has been drawn from works published by scholars who have been 
studying this topic over the past two decades. I have also drawn mostly from literature 
directly pertaining to the case of Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants. In terms of basic 
facts and figures, I have drawn some of this material from government reports (where 
available), and from publications put forth by institutions and organizations. Since 
“official” record keeping of collective remittance statistics has been lackluster, the vast 
majority of the data included in my thesis has been derived from books, academic 
journals, case studies and economic publications pertaining to my chosen subject. 
Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence I have examined suggests that collective remittance 
leveraging schemes have little long term development potential. Many studies that have 
attempted to evaluate Mexico’s pioneering social program have found that not only are 
there issues surrounding the sustainability of completed projects, but that the structure of 
the program, which focuses on courting transnational migrants as development actors, is 
problematic. In this section, I provide a detailed overview of the 3x1 Program for 
Migrants. Following this, I will explore each of the main claims made by proponents of 
collective remittance leveraging schemes; namely that they are pro-poor (in that they can 
target communities afflicted by high levels of poverty), that they are participatory, and 
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that they contribute to projects that aid sustainable community development. Following 
from this, I will provide an analysis of my findings, while considering the context in 
which the discourse surrounding remittances and development is operating.  
The 3x1 Program for Migrants is administered in Mexico by the Secretariat of 
Social Development (SEDESOL), the Governmental department in Mexico that is 
responsible for implementing and overseeing social development programs and efforts in 
Mexico. For every dollar that Mexican HTAs channel into approved development 
projects in their community of origin, the Government will contribute three dollars (one 
dollar each at the federal, state, and municipal level) (SEDESOL.gob.mx, 2015). The 
main purpose of this social program, is to “benefit migrant communities with high levels 
of poverty or marginalization” (SEDESOL.gob.mx, 2015). To better understand the 
driving forces behind the creation of Mexico’s 3x1 Program for Migrants, we must first 
examine the evolution of the Mexico/U.S. collective remittance landscape.  
It is proposed by Durand, Massey and Charvet (2000) that contemporary 
migration patterns between Mexico and the United States date back to the early twentieth 
century, when American agricultural and mining companies began recruiting wage 
laborers from Mexico to fill gaps in the labour supply (p.5). The recruitment of Mexican 
labourers was influenced heavily by policies introduced in the United States around that 
time, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of the 1880s, and the Gentlemen’s Agreement 
with Japan in 1907, which limited “traditional sources” of labourers (Durand, Massey and 
Charvet, 2000:5). Further rates of labour recruitment from Mexico increased after the 
1920s, as “World War I, then the creation of the Soviet Union, and finally the imposition 
of restrictive quotas cut industrialists off from traditional European labor sources” 
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(Durand, Massey and Charvet, 2000:5). Scholar Sarah Lopez, who has charted the history 
of Mexican HTAs in the United States, notes that it was during these decades (1900-
1920s) that Mexican migrants developed the first, U.S. based, “social clubs”, which 
originated “as a response by Mexican migrants to exclusionary practices in U.S. cities” 
(Lopez, 2009:12). Originally, these clubs were not formed based on the origins of a group 
of migrants, but rather “on the places where they settled in the U.S.” (Lopez, 2009:12). 
The activities of these migrant clubs were largely directed at life in the U.S., and involved 
building networks among migrants, and helping one another navigate their new (and 
often socially exclusionary) surroundings (Lopez, 2009:12). Lopez (2009) notes that the 
neoliberal reforms that were rolled out in Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s 
significantly altered the migratory patterns between Mexico and the United States (p.12). 
These reforms, which focused on “reducing state intervention in the economy…[the] 
privitization of state industries and services and the liberalization of trade, foreign direct 
investment, exchange rates, prices and interest rates…”, had immensely negative impacts 
on social conditions in the Latin American region, including (but not limited to) a rise in 
poverty, inequality, and dramatic increases in unemployment (Elton, 2006:2). Of 
particular relevance to this thesis is the relationship between the deteriorating social 
conditions found in this region under neoliberal reforms, and migration, which, for many 
Mexicans, became a coping strategy “to confront these changes in the labor market” 
(Elton, 2006:2). Indeed, as we can see from graph one (below), the number of Mexican 







Note: Sourced From Migration Policy Institute Website. Link: 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/mexican-born-population-
over-time. Accessed on 3/25/2016.  
 
Lopez (2009) notes that it was following this initial surge of emigration from Mexico (in 
the 1980s) that U.S. based Mexican social clubs increasingly became “informal, or formal 
associations of volunteers based on their pueblo of origin as opposed to their current 
residence” (p.12). Club members would often use the social ties created through their 
membership in a club to “practice Mexican culture…to maintain ties to home and create 
space to express themselves in a foreign land…[and to] convert their economic surplus 
into a collective fund for public development in Mexico through collectively remitting” 
(Lopez, 2009:12). Thus, it was within the context of great social upheaval in Mexico, and 
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the desire of migrants to help those who had been left behind in their communities of 
origin, that HTAs were first created (Lopez, 2009:12).  
Initially, HTAs sent collective remittances to communities of origin though 
informal channels (usually though entrusting the money to a fellow migrant from their 
hometown who would physically take the money back to Mexico), and there was much 
uncertainty over how the resources were spent (Lopez, 2009:13). Often, the returning 
migrant would hand off the collected funds to the local priest, who would then be 
responsible for allocating the remittances among community members, or for generating 
assistance from locals to construct a community project (Lopez, 2009:13). There was 
typically no tracking or verifying of the usage of these collective remittances, and the 
uncertainty over how these funds would be used led a group of HTAs from Zacatecas to 
organize with one another to create a migrant Federation (Federacion de Zacatecas) in 
order to address these issues (Lopez, 2009:13). The Federation (which is still in 
existence) acts as an “umbrella non-profit organization, [that] unifies all of the state’s 
HTAs to represent one Zacatecan migrant voice, strengthen social and community 
networks, and structure informal remittance sending”6 (Lopez, 2009:13). By the 1990s, 
HTAs represented by the Federacion de Zacatecas had begun to use portions of their 
collective remittances to finance the refurbishing of “plazas, churches and cemeteries 
with American dollars”, which drew much attention from Mexican State officials (Lopez, 
2009:13). In 1993, through pressure from members of the Federation, State officials in 
Zacatecas began contributing funds to these projects (Lopez, 2009:14). In 1999, the 
                                                          
6 Following from the establishment of the Federacion de Zacatecas, an increasing number of HTAs began 
to organize Federations to represent their home States. Figures from 2005 show that there were thirty 
operating umbrella Federations (Burgess, 2012:122) 
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federal government announced that it would be establishing the 3x1 Program for 
Migrants, and the program formally came into operation in 2002 (Macias, 2012:429). 
Lopez (2009) notes that “the increasing financial power of HTAs caused a shift in the 
Mexican [federal] government towards working directly with [migrants]”, who the 
Government began actively courting for participation in their new social program (Lopez, 
2009:14). This courting has occurred though hailing migrants as “heroes of Mexico” in 
the media, and also by organizing meetings between HTA Federations and Government 
representatives to spread the message of the 3x1 Program for Migrants (Lopez, 2009:15). 
Lopez (2009) argues that in these meetings, migrants are not only “informed of the 
potential of 3x1 to transform rural Mexico”, but they are also “courted” in that the 
meetings focus on the key role that migrants will play in this social transformation if they 
are to participate, casting them as “business partners” and “agents of development” 
(p.15). Also, since the inception of the 3x1 Program for Migrants, municipal level 
officials have been known to contact migrants living abroad, requesting them to form 
HTAs to finance specific projects (Duquette-Rury, et. al, 2013:68).  
Efforts of the Mexican Government to garner migrant support for their innovative 
social program have proven to be quite successful. Table 1 (below) shows that the 
program expanded rapidly and significantly between the years 2002 and 2007, most 
notably in regards to the number of HTAs registered in the program, the number of 
projects implemented, and the dollar amounts contributed at each of the four levels of 
funding (HTA, federal, state and municipal).  





                     Table 1: Mexico’s 3x1 Program: Number of Participating Entities and  
                     Funds Allocated, by Actor, 2002-07 
 
Concept 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Participating 
States 
20 18 23 26 26 27 
Projects 942 899 1436 1691 1274 1613 
Supported 
Municipalities 
247 257 383 425 417 443 
Participating 
Migrant Groups 




8 17 31 35 34 37 
Budget (In Millions of Mexican Pesos) 
Federal/Allocated 
to Projects 
113.7 99.9 175.9 232.1 192.0 257.7 
State, Municipal 
and Migrants  
266.5 277.7 461.8 619.7 556.9 690.8 
 
Note. From “Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A 
                Handbook for Policymakers and Practicioners in Home and Host Countries”,    
                by Aguinas and Newland. Geneva: IOM, 2012. P.194. 
 
More recent figures indicate that the expansion of the program has continued post 2007, 
with table two showing that the federal government’s budget for 3x1 Program for 
Migrants funding has sat at an average of 539.6 million pesos between the years 2008 to 
2014: 
                                          Table 2: Indicators for Mexico’s 3x1 for  
                                           Migrants Program (2008-2014) 
 














                  Note. From “Diagnostico Del Programa 3x1 Para 
                                       Migrantes”, SEDESOL Report, 2014. P.14.  
 
While these figures show that there has been indeed much interest, both on the part of the 
Government and HTAs, in financing development projects through this program, we 
must look a little bit deeper to examine whether or not this program has been able to meet 
its objectives, which are to contribute to community development in Mexico, with a focus 
on the poorest communities that have historically been effected by high levels of 
marginalization (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2008:3).   
Some of the issues with collective remittance leveraging schemes become clear 
when we begin to look at the regional variation in participation levels of Mexico’s 3x1 
Program for Migrants. In one publication by Aparicio and Meseguer (2012), municipal 
level data was collected to “evaluate the programs capacity to target the poorest 
municipalities”, which underpins the programs “progressive” or “pro-poor” tenet. Yet, 
what these scholars found was that the “poorer” the community, the less likely they are to 
participate in this social program. For example, in 2007, less than twenty four percent of 
federal funds under this program were invested into municipalities that are considered 
poor or very poor (p.11). The reason for this, according to the evidence presented by 
Aparicio and Meseguer (2012), is bound to the structure of the program itself, in that it 
induces a self-selection bias: “Given that migrants self-select into the 3x1 program, and 
that Mexican migration is not evenly distributed relative to poverty, the program 
disproportionately benefits relatively well-off municipalities to the detriment of poor 
ones” (p.12).  
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Similarly, Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez (2012) conducted a quantitative study to 
assess the percentage of communities participating in the 3x1 Program for Migrants 
based on marginalization level, where marginalization level was determined by the 
communities’ access to public goods. Variables used to determine marginalization level 
are: population aged fifteen or older who are illiterate, population over the age of fifteen 
who do not have primary education, households without drainage or toilets, electrical 
power, and piped water, households that are overcrowded, and households with a dirt 
floor (Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez, 2012:304). It is noted that the level of 
marginalization determined through these measures shows a strong correlation with the 
headcount of poverty present in a community (as measured by the absolute number of 
individuals living below the national poverty line) (Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez, 
2012:294). The findings of Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez’s study show that the 
government budget for 3x1 Program for Migrants projects was spent differently across 
marginalization levels. For example, in one part of the study, the authors (2012) looked at 
project implementation in the state of Zacatecas between 2002 and 2005. What they 
found is that 34% of the projects implemented during this period in Zacatecas occurred in 
communities that were considered to have a "low" or "very low" level of marginalization. 
In fact, he least number of projects (3.5%) were destined for communities considered 
"very marginalized" (p.294-298). In other words, the lion’s share of projects were being 
implemented in communities that were considered to have low or very low levels of 
poverty, and/or those which already had relatively higher levels of access to public goods.  
In terms of further explaining why this occurs, Bada (2015) contributes 
substantially with findings from his qualitative study of the contributions of US-based 
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HTAs to community development in Mexico, which back up the claims made by the 
above scholars. What he found is that “with a programme design that favours migrants’ 
ability to submit proposals that are backed by HTAs, the [3x1] program primarily 
allocates investments in states where HTA networks are the largest. Consequently, the 
programme tends to allocate resources in areas with a high density of binational networks 
but that are not necessarily the most in need of investments” (p.9). One interview that he 
(2015) conducted with a representative of SEDESOL (the government body overseeing 
the 3x1 program), suggests that inequality at various levels may be inherent in programs 
which are based on migrant demands, rather than on socio-economic need:  
                      It is no secret that the highest proportion of international    
                      migrants is from the north and the Bajío Zamorano region, but  
                      few of the municipalities in the Bajío are marginalized.  
                      Therefore, 60 percent of the matching fund program goes to   
                      municipalities with high migratory intensity indexes but not  
                      necessarily those with high marginalization. We have only  
                      been able to allocate 40 percent of the budget to thirty-five   
                      municipalities with the highest marginalization. These   
                      communities don’t have water or sewage, but migrants want to  
                      fix the public square, build a church or a rodeo ring. We try to  
                      encourage them to fund projects that focus on immediate and  
                      basic needs, but we can’t force them. The program has decided  
                      to respect their will. (p.9) 
 
As expressed in the quote above, not only does the design of Mexico’s 3x1 
Program for Migrants hinder its progressive potential, but there is also a high level of 
discontinuity between the project related desires of HTA members, and those of non-
migrants. Bada (2015) argues that the structure of the program results in a community 
development model where non-migrants “run the risk of having their voices silenced”, 
given the limited space for their involvement in project planning (p.3) Thus, Bada calls 
30 
 
into question the participatory nature of this program, by prompting the question: 
participation for whom?  
A clear example of the “silencing” of local voices that can occur within this 
development model is brought to light through the work of Rahel Kunz, whose 
qualitative research highlighted a significant lack of consideration for local input during 
the decision making process of 3x1 Program for Migrants projects. Kunz (2011) provides 
the example of a project designed to build a well in a community in Los Pilares, Mexico. 
She notes:  
Many of my respondents did not agree with the well project. 
They often mentioned the case of a neighbouring community 
where a well project had been implemented through 3x1 
funding. In that case, the community had to make regular 
financial contributions to keep the well functioning, which in 
some cases met with resistance. When the electrical device 
operating the well broke, the community was asked to pay for 
its repair, which led to disputes. In the end, the well was out 
of order for several months, and it was not clear who was 
going to pay for the repair. Having learnt about this example 
of a failed well project, many of the interviewees were 
concerned to avoid this. Instead, there was an alternative 
proposition: many women in the community suggested they 
would prefer transforming a natural barranca into a basin to 
collect water, which would be cheaper and require less 
maintenance…the women knew about the potential problems, 
yet during preparation for the project, their voices were not 
heard (p.129) 
 
In this quote, Kunz notes the way in which the program’s “migrant bias” simultaneously 
excludes local voices from the decision making process, while also requiring the same 
community members to provide resources (through labor or financial contributions) to 
maintain projects. Indeed, Kunz’s (2011) research shows that: 
Maintenance work and costs for the project are generally 
shouldered by the community members, and thereby often 
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indirectly by non-migrant women. These can be substantial 
and can lead to the failure of the project in the long term…it 
is all the more surprising that the community members who 
have to contribute to the financing and maintenance of such 
projects are not given a voice in planning and implementation 
decisions (p.130).  
 
 
Further, surveys conducted in Jerez, a municipality in southern Zacatecas, show that local 
knowledge of the program itself can often be limited, with over 72% of local respondents 
stating that they “knew nothing about it [the program]” (Garcia Zamora, 2005:28). The 
author notes that this figure is surprising given that “[the 3x1 Program for Migrants] is 
the most important state and national program [of its type], and it originated in 
Zacatecas” (Garcia Zamora, 2005:28). Furthermore, this figure, while not necessarily 
representative of program knowledge nation-wide, is indicative of a lack of engagement 
between locals and migrants when it comes to project planning and program 
participation. 
Regarding the sustainability of 3x1 Program for Migrants projects, Bada (2015) 
notes that “there are no academically reliable evaluations of the failure rate of Three-for-
One productive projects” (p.9). However, based on the qualitative interviews Bada (2015) 
conducted in his study (both with HTA representatives, and government representatives 
in Mexico), it is estimated that approximately fifty percent of the “productive” projects 
implemented under the 3x1 Program for Migrants fail within a “few” years (p.9). The 
reasons for this vary substantially, and include a lack of both initial planning and project 
follow ups, labor shortages (in areas where the majority of youth continue to emigrate), 
and an inability to compete at the market level with agricultural products (Bada, 2015, 





In keeping with the transnational theory of migration, it is important to analyze 
the continuation of the 3x1 Program for Migrants within the broader socio-economic 
context in which it was created. The evidence presented above shows that Mexico is an 
exemplary case of the measures States take to court populations abroad under the 
“Diaspora Option”, in that the Mexican Government has actively worked to frame out-
migration as a process that can be beneficial for Mexican development (Lopez, 2009). 
This has included reframing their relationship with their diaspora, by hailing them in the 
media as “heroes of Mexico” for their economic contributions to their homeland, and 
through actively courting Mexican migrants to participate in the 3x1 Program for 
Migrants (Kunz, 2012:104, Lopez, 2009:). However, when placed under scrutiny, an 
examination of the 3x1 Program for Migrants shows that the program itself fails in its 
objective to function as a participatory and pro-poor model of community development 
despite the efforts of the Mexican Government to frame it as such. Much of this is due to 
the structure of the program which has focused on capturing the capital of its diaspora. 
This has favored the desires of U.S. based Mexicans over those of local citizens and has 
missed a possible opportunity to foster cooperation between these two groups. There is 
also room to question who seeks to benefit most from the way in which the Mexican 
Government has engaged its diaspora in recent years. The evidence shows that HTAs 
have developed over time through the agency of migrants who wish to remain connected 
to their communities of origin and contribute in some way to the betterment of their 
homeland (Lopez, 2009:12). This is incredibly honourable, especially considering that 
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many of the individuals involved in generating collective remittances (which are in 
essence, donations) live in precarious conditions themselves, as labor migrants (Elton, 
2006:2). The way in which the Mexican Government has institutionalized their diaspora’s 
philanthropic efforts legitimizes the notion that Mexican migrants are responsible for 
helping to provide even the most basic of goods and services to their communities of 
origin (like water, and electricity). As Pellerin and Mullings (2013) put it in their 
historical analysis of the discourse surrounding this topic, the “diaspora option, has 
obscured the selective, market-driven orientation of most of the policies supported within 
this option, and the subtle way that these policies are shifting the risk and responsibility 
for social transformation away from the state and private corporations, and towards 
migrant populations” (p.90).  
       Further, the evidence shows that the consequences of the neoliberal reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s are intimately related to both the phenomenon of Mexican-U.S. 
migration, and the subsequent remittances that are generated through this process. 
Despite migration (and the sending of remittances) being utilized by many individuals as 
a strategy to mitigate the social consequences of neoliberal policies, the discourse 
surrounding remittances and development acts to reframe these financial flows as a 
positive result of neoliberal globalization. As Elton (2006), points out, the current 
discourse surrounding the relationship between migration and remittances de-politicizes 
the issues at hand altogether, in that it fails to acknowledge the complex relationship 
between neoliberalism, migration, and underdevelopment:  
the remittance hype largely misses the point: Some of the 
very entities now celebrating remittances as a remedy for 
underdevelopment prescribed and promoted policies that 
created the conditions for increased emigration from many 
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countries across Latin America and the Caribbean since the 
late 1980s…that’s why it is so unsettling to hear the 
organizations that prescribed and imposed these reforms as 
loan conditions celebrating this fruit of failure as a remedy 
for underdevelopment. It is even more unsettling when one 
considers that the majority of people who migrate from Latin 
America do so without documents, risking, and sometimes 
losing, life and limb along the way. (p.2). 
The discourse surrounding remittance led development implicitly legitimizes the contexts 
in which remittances are generated, the historical processes which have led to such a 
world where remittances flourish, and fails to acknowledge that remittances are a 
consequence of unequal social relations. The discursive representation of the relationship 
between migration, remittances and development, has serious implications to how 
development is conceptualized. Migration (irrespective of contextual migratory 
experiences) becomes reframed as a “win-win” scenario for sending and receiving 
nations despite the lack of evidence to suggest that this model of development has the 
potential to address the structural causes of marginalization in Mexico.  
Section VI 
Conclusion 
As the evidence has shown, the 3x1 Program for Migrants has in many ways failed in its 
objective to function as a participatory and pro-poor model of community development. It 
has been shown that there are limitations, notably related to the structure of the program 
itself, that prevent resources from being channeled to communities that need them the 
most, while also marginalizing local citizens from playing a role in determining the 
development trajectory of their own communities. In this sense, the 3x1 Program for 
Migrants has shown to be neither participatory, nor pro-poor, despite the efforts of the 
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Mexican Government and various pro-remittance scholars to frame it as such. Further, we 
can see from the data provided that the 3x1 Program for Migrants is not designed to 
address the structural issues that have created and maintained social conditions such as 
poverty throughout Mexico, yet the State continues to actively pursue the capital of 
migrants to subsidize their social spending. This case study demonstrates that the 
discourse surrounding the relationship between migration, remittances and development 
has depoliticized migration by reframing it as a positive, fruit bearing component of 
neoliberal globalization. This has the effect of glazing over the highly contextual 
inequalities that many individuals find themselves faced with throughout the migration 
process, while also neglecting to address the structural roots of issues such as poverty and 
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